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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: REVISED WG DRAFT REPORT ON OVERT GROUND INSPECTION

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

REF: A) STATE 87763; B) USNATO 2070

1. STAFF GROUP HAS TRANSMITTED NATO-WIDE REVISED TEXT OF DRAFT REPORT ON OVERT GROUND INSPECTION, WHICH WILL APPEAR AS AC/276-WP(74)5(3RD REVISE). NEW TEXT RESULTS FROM WG'S MAY 7 MEETING, DURING WHICH U.S. REP DREW FULLY ON REF A GUIDANCE, WHICH HE SUBSEQUENTLY CIRCULATED AS SPEAKING NOTE AT REQUEST OF SEVERAL DELS. FRG REP ALSO PUT FORWARD SUBSTANTIALLY REVISED ESTIMATES OF EXISTING MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ON PACT SIDE OF NGA, AS SET FORTH IN APPENDIX 1 OF ANNEX A OF DRAFT REPORT. SINCE NO ONE DISPUTED FRG'S PROPOSED FIGURES, THEY ARE NOW INCLUDED IN NEW REVISION. THIS INCLUSION HAS HAD EFFECT OF INCREASING 66 TEAM FIGURE TO 100. NEW FIGURE IS NOW DEFINED, HOWEVER, AS A MAXIMUM FOR A "FULLY SECRET

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COMPREHENSIVE" SYSTEM. TERM "FULLY EFFECTIVE" HAS BEEN DROPPED THROUGHOUT TEXT, SINCE WG AGREED WITH U.S. REP THAT IT COULD NOT BE QUANTITATIVELY DEFINED.

2. DURING DISCUSSION, GENERAL REACTION WAS THAT U.S. HAD NOW MADE BETTER CASE FOR 25 TEAM APPROACH. SINCE U.S. APPROACH ENVISIONED DETECTION OF GROSS CHANGES IN FORCE LEVELS AND ACTIVITIES, AND USING U.S. ARGUMENT THAT DIFFERENT ANALYTICAL APPROACHES AND COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO DIFFERENT ESTIMATES OF TEAMS REQUIRED, MAJORITY FELT THAT WG PAPER SHOULD SET FORTH A RANGE IN WHICH A MINIMUM (25), UP TO A "FULLY COMPREHENSIVE" SYSTEM (100) WAS IDENTIFIED. FRG SAID BONN COULD PROBABLY ACCEPT THIS APPROACH, AS LONG AS PAPER ALSO NOTED THAT "POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY" (TO BE DETERMINED IN SPC) MUST ULTIMATELY CONTROL THE SIZE AND CONFIGURATION OF AN OVERT SYSTEM. (FOOTNOTE TO THIS EFFECT NOW APPEARS IN BASIC REPORT.)

3. FOLLOWING MEETING, U.S. REP WORKED WITH STAFF GROUP TO BUILD INTO TEXT MAJORITY OF KEY U.S. REF A POINTS. IN VIEW OF CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR PUTTING FORWARD CONCEPT OF ESTABLISHING A RANGE IN PAPER, HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO SECURE AGREEMENT TO U.S. VIEW (PARA 5 REF A) THAT NUMBER OF TEAMS ACTUALLY "NEEDED" WOULD BE ABOUT 25. REVISED LANGUAGE IN PARAS 8, 20 AND 24 OF ANNEX A WHICH RESULTED FROM THIS DISCUSSION WOULD SEEM, HOWEVER, TO COVER U.S. PREFERENCES FOR 25 TEAMS WITHIN THE RANGE CONCEPT. COUPLED WITH FRG CAVEAT, NOTED IN PARA 1 ABOVE, IT THUS HAS THE EFFECT OF REFERRING QUESTION OF ACTUAL NUMBER OF TEAMS REQUIRED TO POLITICAL LEVEL FOR DECISION.

4. BELOW IS REVISED TEXT OF WG REPORT LESS APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A AND ANNEX B, BOTH OF WHICH REMAIN UNCHANGED. WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON REACTIONS IF POSSIBLE IN TIME FOR MAY 15 WG MEETING WHEN PAPER WILL NEXT BE DISCUSSED. WE UNDERSTAND ALL ALLIES (INCLUDING FRG) CAN NOW ACCEPT PAPER AS TECHNICAL STUDY. WG CONTINUES TO BE INTERESTED IN PRODUCING TECHNICAL ADVICE TO SPC BEFORE LATTER RETURNS TO VERIFICATION AND TAKES UP GERMAN AMENDMENTS. AS NOTED PARA 4 REF A, PRESENCE OF WG FINDINGS COULD PROVIDE FAVORABLE BACKGROUND FOR SEEKING TO MODIFY FRG VIEWS ON MOBILE TEAMS.

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BEGIN TEXT

MBFR - NEGOTIATED INSPECTION - GROUND SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

1. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, IN THIS PAPER, EXAMINE THE SCALE OR DENSITY OF MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION SYSTEM. THE AIM IS TO PROVIDE RESPONSE TO THE REQUIREMENT(1) BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE.

ASSUMPTIONS AND BACKGROUND

2. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE APPROACHED THIS ASSESSMENT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ANY OVERT VERIFICATION SYSTEM, INCLUDING INSPECTION BY MOBILE TEAMS, WOULD BE A SUPPLEMENT TO OTHER MEANS OF VERIFICATION. THE WORKING GROUP THEREFORE ESTIMATE THE DENSITY OF MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION SYSTEM, ON THE BASIS THAT THE PRIMARY ROLE OF THE MOBILE TEAMS WILL BE:

(A) TO MONITOR ACTUAL WITHDRAWALS AND REDUCTIONS OF FORCES AND SO VERIFY THAT AGREED ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

(B) CONCURRENT WITH AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE WITHDRAWAL/REDUCTION PHASE, TO SUPPLEMENT OTHER MEANS OF VERIFICATION AND TO "RESOLVE AMBIGUITIES FOR CONFRONTING A VIOLATOR WITH EVIDENCE OF HIS VIOLATION, AND TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE".

(C) TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE TO ACQUIRE AND REPORT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON WP FORCES, NOTABLY ANY MOVEMENT OR CONCENTRATION WHICH MIGHT APPEAR TO BE IN BREACH OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT.

3. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT ALL AVAILABLE STUDIES PREVIOUSLY CONDUCTED ON THIS SUBJECT, AND IN PARTICULAR THOSE BY THE SUB-GROUP ON VERIFICATION(2) AND THE UNITED STATES(3) WHICH SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS VERIFICATION BY MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE ALSO NOTED THE STUDY (4) ON THE TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE AND VERIFY WITHDRAWAL OF REDUCTIONS.

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4. THE WORKING GROUP, ALTHOUGH CONSCIOUS THAT THERE ARE POSSIBLE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS IN RECIPROCAL INSPECTION, AND IN THE MATTER OF NEGOTIABILITY, HAVE NOT BEEN INFLUENCED BY THESE FACTORS IN THE EXAMINATION(5). THE PAPER DOES, HOWEVER, INCLUDE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SCALE OF WP MOBILE TEAMS WHICH MIGHT OPERATE IN THE REDUCTION AREA IF THE SYSTEM RECOMMENDED BY THE WORKING GROUP IS LATER ADOPTED AND NEGOTIATED. THE EXAMINATION IS THEREFORE PURELY MILITARY AND TECHNICAL.

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ASSESSMENT

5. IT IS NOT PRACTICABLE TO ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF INSPECTORS REQUIRED TO VERIFY REDUCTIONS AND WITHDRAWALS EXCEPT ON ARBITRARY ASSUMPTIONS. PRECISE NUMBERS COULD BE DERIVED ONLY AFTER THE SCALE OF WP REDUCTIONS AND THE RATE AND ROUTE OF WITHDRAWALS HAD BEEN DECIDED THROUGH NEGOTIATION WITH THE WP POWERS. WHILE THE SCALE COULD BE BASED ON ALLIED PROPOSALS, THE RATE AND ROUTES SPECIFIED FOR WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE MAJOR FACTORS IN ASSESSING TEAM DENSITY. THESE COULD VARY VERY WIDELY. IT IS NOTED THAT THE US PAPER OF 5TH OCTOBER, 1973 CALCULATED THE REQUIREMENT, BASED ON MOBILE TEAMS PLUS ONE STATIC TEAM AT A SPECIFIED CROSSING AT 75-100 MEN. THE US ESTIMATE FOR THE POST-REDUCTION TASK IS IN THE RANGE 24-33 MOBILE TEAMS - A TOTAL OF 200 MEN PLUS.

6. THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS PRACTICABLE TO ESTIMATE WITH REASONABLE CONFIDENCE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF INSPECTION

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TEAMS REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT THE TASKS AT PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE FOR SPECIFIC AREAS AND FORCES IN THE PERIOD AFTER REDUCTIONS/WITHDRAWALS HAVE TAKEN PLACE. WE ALSO CONSIDER THAT THIS WIDER-RANGING TASK WOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TEAMS TO MONITOR WITHDRAWALS AND REDUCTIONS PROVIDED THAT THESE ARE EFFECTED BY THE WP FORCES IN TERMS OF UNITS AND FORMATIONS, AS ENVISAGED IN THE ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS(6).

7. IN MAKING THIS ASSESSMENT, THE WORKING GROUP HAVE TAKEN THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS AND FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT:

(A) THE BASIS OF THE ASSESSMENT OF NUMBERS OF INSPECTING TEAMS SHALL BE THE NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS TO BE VISITED REGULARLY, AND THE AREA TO BE COVERED.

(B) INSPECTION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO INSTALLATIONS OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE; THE FREQUENCY OF INSPECTIONS SHOULD VARY ACCORDING TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INSTALLATION

(SEE ANNEX A, APPENDIX 1).

(C) ALL SOVIET DIVISIONS IN THE NGA ARE CATEGORY A, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET FORCES IN EAST GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE BETTER PLACED FOR COMMITMENT THAN THOSE IN POLAND IN NORMAL PEACETIME CONDITIONS.

(D) THE DIFFERENCE IN AREA BETWEEN POLAND ON THE ONE HAND (312,500 KM²) AND THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON THE OTHER (RESPECTIVELY 108,200 KM² AND 128,000 KM²) WOULD ITSELF NECESSITATE A GREATER NUMBER OF INSPECTORS IN POLAND.

8. THE ASSESSMENT OF REQUIREMENTS AND DETAILS OF FORMULAE APPLIED ARE INCLUDED AT ANNEX A. THE TOTALS OF INSPECTION TEAMS ARE ASSESSED AT:

(A) GDR 30 TEAMS

(B) POLAD 50 TEAMS

(C) CSSR 25 TEAMS

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THIS IS ROUNDED TO 100 TEAMS FOR WORKING PURPOSES.

9. IF THE AREA FACTOR WERE APPLIED TO THE NATO TERRITORIES IN THE NGA, THE NUMBER OF WP MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS BASED ON NATO TERRITORY WOULD BE 60.

TERMS USED

10. AT ANNEX B ARE CLARIFICATIONS OF THE TERMS "CLANDESTINE", "NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS" AND "NATIONAL MEANS" AS USED IN THE VERIFICATION CONTEXT.

RECOMMENDATION

11. FOR VERIFICATION TO BE FULLY COMPREHENSIVE IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT A MAXIMUM OF SOME 100 MOBILE TEAMS, SUPPORTED BY AERIAL INSPECTION AND SOME STATIC POSTS WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE WORKING

GROUP NOTE THAT THE LOWEST FIGURE QUOTED FOR A MINIMAL VERIFICATION SYSTEM IS THAT OF 25 IN THE US PAPER. CLEARLY THE FEWER TEAMS DEPLOYED

THE LESS EFFECTIVE WILL BE THE RESULTANT VERIFICATION SYSTEM.

ANNEX A

MBFR - NEGOTIATED INSPECTION - GROUND SYSTEM

DETAILED CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1.
(A) BOTH AC/276-WP(70)35(REVISED), PAGES 25-27 AND PAGES 30-32, AND THE US PAPER ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION OF 5TH OCTOBER, 1973, PAGES 34-45, DISCUSS THE VARIOUS POSSIBLE METHODS OF INSPECTION. IN ISD/65(4TH REVISE) THE EMPHASIS IS LAID ON MOBILE TEAMS AND THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IS NOW ASKED TO GIVE ADVICE ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE TEAMS.
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(B) THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO OUTLINE AN INSPECTION SYSTEM, BASED ON MOBILE TEAMS, GIVING A BEST ASSESSMENT OF THE NUMBER OF TEAMS REQUIRED.

2. IN AC/276-D(74)1 THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, HAVING STUDIED THESE TWO PAPERS AND AC/276-D(72)1 - ACCEPTABILITY OF INSPECTION TO NATO - MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

(A) "13.... IT WOULD BE IN NATO'S INTEREST TO ACHIEVE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER (MOBILE) TEAMS WHICH COULD BE TOLERATED ON A BASIS OF DIRECT RECIPROCITY BY THOSE NATIONS DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE PRESENCE OF THE TEAMS".

(B) "19.... THE WORKING GROUP TAKE THE VIEW THAT PROVIDED THE SECURITY RISKS TO NATO ARE NOT SERIOUS, A MEASURE OF NEGOTIATED AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE (E.G. AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHY) WOULD MATERIALLY ASSIST NATO'S VERIFICATION PROCESS, AS COMPLEMENTARY TO THE ACTIVITIES OF GROUND OBSERVERS. STATIC OBSERVATION TEAMS AT A FEW SELECTED KEY MOVEMENT CENTRES WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO THE EXTENT THAT ANY MOVEMENT CONSTATINTS AGREEMENT SPECIFIED THE USE OF THE CENTRES ONLY FOR MAJOR MOVEMENTS."

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AC/276-WP(70)35(REVISED) ON MOBILE TEAMS

3. THIS PAPER STATES THAT THERE ARE 2,950 MILITARY COMPLEXES IN POLAD, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR WHICH SHOULD BE VISITED WEEKLY. A FURTHER 1,200 DEPOTS NEED TO BE VISITED ONLY MONTHLY. USING THE EXPERIENCE GAINED BY MLMS THE PAPER RECOMMENDS THAT 130 TWO-MAN MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE NEEDED TO CARRY OUT THESE INSPECTIONS.

4. TO SUPPORT THESE 130 TEAMS, 20 SUB-HEADQUARTERS WOULD BE REQUIRED. INCLUDING THE TEAMS, SUB-HEADQUARTERS, RESERVES AND ADMINISTRATIVE OVERHEADS THE TOTAL MANPOWER REQUIREMENT WOULD BE ABOUT 480.

US PAPER OF 5TH OCTOBER, 1973

5. THIS PAPER DISCUSSES INITIALLY, THE WITHDRAWAL PHASE AND CALCULATES
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THAT, PROVIDED ONE MAJOR EXIT POINT WERE AGREED, A STATIC TEAM OF ABOUT 24 MEN COULD CHECK WITHDRAWALS THROUGH ONE EXIT POINT. ALTERNATIVELY MOBILE TEAMS, SUPPORTED BY AT LEAST ONE STATIC TEAM AT A SPECIFIED BORDER CROSSING, COULD PROVIDE FULLER COVERAGE OF WITHDRAWALS; THIS WOULD REQUIRE 75-100 MEN.

6. IN THE POST-REDUCTION PHASE, THIS PAPER BASES ITS CALCULATIONS ON THREE ASSUMPTIONS:

(A) COMPLETE COVERAGE IS REQUIRED OF THE HARD SURFACE (MACADAM OR CONCRETE) ROAD NET AT LEAST MONTHLY.

(B) EACH MAJOR INSTALLATION (HOLDING ONE OR MORE REGIMENTS) IS TO BE OBSERVED WEEKLY.

(C) SPOT COVERAGE REQUIREMENTS WILL BE MET BY REALLOCATING RESOURCES FROM ROUTINE COVERAGE.

THE EXPERIENCE OF MLMS IN EAST GERMANY IS USED TO CALCULATE APPROXIMATELY THE LEVEL OF EFFORT AND AMOUNT OF TIME REQUIRED TO MEET THESE CRITERIA.

7. THE PAPER CALCULATES THAT THE NUMBER OF MOBILE TEAMS REQUIRED WOULD BE:

(A) GDR: ABOUT 15 TEAMS BUT POSSIBLY AS LOW AS 10.

(B) CZECHOSLOVAKIA: ABOUT 7 OR 8 TEAMS.

(C) POLAND: ABOUT 7 TO 10 TEAMS.

THIS GIVES A MAXIMUM OF 33 AND A MINIMUM OF 24 TEAMS. THE PAPER ROUNDS

THIS OFF AS 25 TEAMS DEPENDENT ON 9 SECTORS BASED IN THE THREE CAPITALS AND AT SIX MILITARY DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS. THE MANPOWER IS ESTIMATED AT 100 INSPECTORS INCLUDING RELIEFS AND AT LEAST 100 SUPPORT PERSONNEL, GIVING A TOTAL OF 200 MEN PLUS.

8. THE US RATIONALE FOR BELIEVING THAT 25 TEAMS WOULD BE ADEQUATE
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IS AS FOLLOWS. ALTHOUGH INCREASES IN TEAM NUMBERS MIGHT PRODUCE PROPORTIONATE INCREASES IN FREQUENCY AND DETAIL OF REPORTING, IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THE UTILITY OF CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FOR VERIFICATION WOULD ALSO INCREASE PROPORTIONATELY. NO GROUND INSPECTORATE IS LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO INSURE THAT ALL VIOLATIONS WOULD BE DETECTED, ESPECIALLY AS THE VIOLATOR WOULD PRESUMABLY TAKE STEPS TO EVADE DETECTION. ON THIS BASIS, AN INSPECTORATE OF THE SIZE ENVISAGED, WITH RESOURCES AND ACCESS TO ASSIST IN DETECTING MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT VIOLATIONS, WOULD PROBABLY MAKE CLOSE TO THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION. WHEN SPECIAL SITUATIONS ARISE THAT REQUIRE OR ARE AMENABLE TO GREATER INSPECTION (SUCH AS POSSIBLE SCHEDULED DISBANDMENT OF FORCES OR MAJOR MANOEUVRES) THE USE OF SPECIAL OBSERVERS IS FORESEEN. THEREFORE AN INSPECTORATE WHICH CAN PERIODICALLY CHECK SIGNIFICANT (REGIMENTAL) INSTALLATIONS AND ROUTINELY COVER MAJOR LOCs WOULD GIVE MOST OF WHAT COULD BE EXPECTED FROM GROUND INSPECTION. INCREASED NUMBERS OF INSPECTORS WOULD NOT PROVIDE PROPORTIONALLY INCREASED ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE.

DISCUSSION

COMPARISON OF THE TWO PAPERS

9. IT WILL BE SEEN THAT THE WORKING GROUP PAPER ESTIMATES

THAT 130 MOBILE TEAMS, BASED ON 20 SECTORS AND TOTALLING ABOUT 480 MEN, WOULD COVER THE POST-REDUCTION PERIOD. THE PAPER DOES NOT DISCUSS IN DETAIL THE REDUCTION PHASE AS "... IT IS A SPECIAL PROBLEM, IN WHICH A RELATIVELY HIGH DEGREE OF CO-OPERATION CAN BE EXPECTED FROM AN ADVERSARY ...".

10. THE US PAPER DOES CONSIDER BOTH THE REDUCTION AND POST-REDUCTION PHASES AND OFFERS THE TOTALS OF 75-100 MEN TO COVER THE REDUCTION PHASE AND 200 MEN, BASED ON 9 SECTORS, TO COVER THE POST-REDUCTION PHASE.

THE REDUCTION PHASE

11. WHEN CONSIDERING THE REDUCTION PHASE BOTH PAPERS ASSUME FULL CO-OPERATION BY THE SOVIETS IN GIVING DETAILS OF THE UNITS TO BE WITHDRAWN AND THE WITHDRAWAL ROUTES. THE TASK
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OF CHECKING WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE GREATLY SIMPLIFIED IF THE NUMBER OF EXIT POINTS WERE LIMITED BY AGREEMENT.

12. NEITHER PAPER CONSIDERS THE DETAILS OF A SECOND REDUCTION PHASE WHEN INDIGENOUS FORCES WOULD BE DEACTIVATED AND THEIR EQUIPMENT STORED. THIS PROCESS POSES DIFFERENT PROBLEMS FROM THOSE PRESENTED BY THE CHECKING OF COMPLETE UNITS AND FORMATIONS WITHDRAWING TO THE USSR.

13. THE TWO REDUCTION PHASES COULD EACH VERY POSSIBLY CONTINUE OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS.

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THE POST-REDUCTION PHASE

14. IN THIS PHASE THE ROLE OF INSPECTORS WOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT FORCES REMAINED AT THE LEVELS RESULTING FROM THE REDUCTIONS. THE PROBLEMS WOULD THEREFORE BE THE SAME FOR INSPECTORS FROM BOTH SIDES. THIS PHASE WILL OVERLAP THE FIRST REDUCTION PHASE, RUN THROUGH THE SECOND REDUCTION PHASE AND CONTINUE SUBSEQUENTLY.

ELEMENTS REQUIRED OF AN INSPECTION SYSTEM

15.

(A) AN INSPECTION SYSTEM WOULD NEED TO CHECK:

- (1) WITHDRAWAL OF FORMED UNITS.
 - (2) DEACTIVATION OF INDIGENOUS UNITS.
 - (3) WITHDRAWAL OF INDIVIDUALS OUT OF THE AREA THROUGH CHECKPOINTS.
 - (4) DEMOBILISATION OF INDIVIDUALS BELONGING TO INDIGENOUS
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FORCES IN SPECIFIED LOCATIONS.

- (5) THE STORAGE OF EQUIPMENT OF DEACTIVATED UNITS.
- (6) MAINTENANCE OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS.

(B) THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FROM AN INSPECTION SYSTEM ARE:

- (1) ACCURACY IN CHECKING.
- (2) RAPID IDENTIFICATION OF ABNORMAL ACTIVITY.
- (3) RAPID AND ACCURATE REPORTING.

(C) THE SYSTEM SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE, AS AN IMPORTANT BONUS:

- (1) ENHANCED WARNING TIME.
- (2) INCREASED KNOWLEDGE OF WARSAW PACT FORCES.

(D) THE DESIGN OF THE SYSTEM SHOULD OBVIATE FRICTION AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.

16.

(A) TO CARRY OUT TASK 15(A)(6) MOBILE TEAMS ARE GENERALLY ACCEPTED AS THE MOST SATISFACTORY. TO CARRY OUT THE FIRST FIVE TASKS THE PROCESS OF CHECKING WOULD TEND TO BE RATHER MORE STATIC E.G. AT POINTS OF DEPARTURE FROM THE NGA AND AT DEMOBILIZATION CENTRES; STATIC TEAMS, TAILOR-MADE TO EACH TASK, WOULD BE MOST SUITED TO PERFORM THESE MOST EFFICIENTLY.

(B) THESE TASKS COULD BE CARRIED OUT BY MOBILE TEAMS PROVIDED THAT FULL INFORMATION WERE PROVIDED TO

INSPECTORS ON THE DETAILS OF WITHDRAWALS AND DEACTIVATIONS. THE USE OF MOBILE TEAMS WOULD HOWEVER INVOLVE REMOVAL OF THESE TEAMS FROM TASKS MORE SUITED TO THEM. IDEALLY THEREFORE THE INSPECTION SYSTEM WOULD CONSIST OF A NET OF MOBILE TEAMS SUPPORTED BY A LIMITED NUMBER OF STATIC POSTS AT MAJOR EXIT POINTS, DEMOBILIZATION CENTRES AND EQUIPMENT STORAGE DEPOTS.

(C) AT APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A IS A SUMMARY OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE VARIOUS POSSIBLE METHODS OF VERIFICATION.

CALCULATION OF TEAMS REQUIRED

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17. POST-REDUCTION PHASE IN AN EFFORT TO BALANCE THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF TEAMS RECOMMENDED BY THE TWO PAPERS A TENTATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE WP PART OF THE NGA HAS BEEN MADE. THE DETAILS OF THIS ANALYSIS ARE AT APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACTORS AND ASSUMPTIONS MENTIONED IN THE TWO BASIC PAPERS, THOSE IN APPENDIX 1 AND

PARAGRAPHS 12-15 ABOVE, IT IS CALCULATED THAT SOME 100 MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE NEEDED TO INSPECT EFFECTIVELY DURING THE POST-REDUCTION PHASE.

18. THE REDUCTION PHASES

THE NATO REDUCTION PROPOSAL FORESEES TWO PHASES. THE FIRST COVERING US/USSR FORCES ONLY AND THE SECOND COVERING INDIGENOUS AS WELL AS STATIONED FORCES.

(A) THE INITIAL REDUCTION PHASE WILL BE CONCURRENT WITH THE NEED TO BEGIN CHECKS ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION. THE SECOND REDUCTION PHASE WILL OVERLAP THE POST-REDUCTION PERIOD OF THE FIRST PHASE. THUS THERE WOULD BE A BUILD-UP OF VERIFICATION ACTIVITY STARTING WITH THE FIRST WITHDRAWALS AND REACHING A MAXIMUM DURING THE SECOND REDUCTION PHASE.

(B) IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE USSR IN THE INITIAL PHASE WOULD BE WILLING TO DETAIL THE UNITS TO BE WITHDRAWN, THEIR INITIAL BARRACKS, ROUTES AND EXIT POINTS. CHECKING AT EXIT POINTS, PARTICULARLY IF THESE CAN BE LIMITED BY AGREEMENT, WOULD BE A STATIC TASK. POSSIBLY 3 SUCH POINTS COULD BE NEGOTIATED. TO INSPECT THE ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL MOVEMENT OF A TANK ARMY THE FULL NUMBER OF 100 MOBILE TEAMS WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED.

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(C) IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY EXACTLY HOW MANY MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO CHECK THIS MOVEMENT UNTIL THE RATE OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL IS KNOWN. A HIGH RATE OF WITHDRAWAL MIGHT NECESSITATE PERHAPS 60 TEAMS FOR A SHORT TIME; FOR A SLOW RATE OF WITHDRAWAL THE FIGURE MIGHT BE 30 TEAMS FOR A LONGER PERIOD. HOWEVER, THE BALANCE OF THE 100 MOBILE TEAMS COULD BE NEEDED IN THE SAME PERIOD TO CHECK THAT WITHDRAWN SOVIET FORCES DO NOT RE-ENTER THE NGA AND THAT OTHER SOVIET FORCES DO NOT ENTER IT AND THEREBY CIRCUMVENT THE PHASE I AGREEMENT.

(D) VERIFICATION IN THE SECOND REDUCTION PHASE WOULD NEED TO COVER THE DEACTIVATION, DEMOBILISATION AND EQUIPMENT STORAGE OF INDIGENOUS TROOPS AS WELL AS ANY FURTHER SOVIET WITHDRAWALS. THIS WOULD THEREFORE BE AN EXTREMELY ACTIVE TIME WHEN ALL TEAMS AND POSTS WOULD BE REQUIRED.

(E) IF EXIT POINTS, DEMOBILISATION CENTRES AND STORAGE
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DEPOTS CAN BE LIMITED BY TREATY THEN STATIC POSTS COULD MOST EFFICIENTLY CHECK THESE AREAS. IF CONTROL ELEMENTS OF THE VERIFICATION ORGANIZATION ARE SUITABLY SITED THEN THE STATIC POSTS COULD BE BASED UPON THESE AND SO SAVE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERHEADS. A POSSIBLE NUMBER FOR THESE POSTS IS 9, BASED ON THE 9 SECTORS MENTIONED IN PARA 10 ABOVE.

19. BUILD-70 OF VERIFICATION ORGANISATION

(A) THE PROBABILITY THAT FEWER TEAMS AND POSTS WOULD BE REQUIRED IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF REDUCTION THAN LATER WOULD BE MILITARILY USEFUL IN THAT THE TRAINING OF TEAMS COULD BE SPREAD AND THE EXPERIENCE OF EARLIER TEAMS COULD BE USED IN THE TRAINING OF LATER TEAMS.

(B) AN INITIAL STAFF STUDY OF A POSSIBLE COMPLETE VERIFICATION ORGANIZATION (TEAMS, POSTS, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, ANALYSIS, LIAISON AND ADMINISTRATION) SUGGESTS THAT THE TOTAL MANPOWER REQUIREMENT COULD BE IN THE ORDER OF 600-700 MEN BASED ON 9 SECTORS.

20. EFFECTIVENESS OF VERIFICATION

(A) FOR VERIFICATION TO BE FULLY COMPREHENSIVE IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED THAT SOME 100 MOBILE TEAMS, SUPPORTED BY AERIAL INSPECTION AND SOME STATIC POSTS, WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE WORKING GROUP NOTE THAT THE LOWEST FIGURE QUOTED FOR A MINIMAL VERIFICATION SYSTEM IS THAT OF 25 IN THE US PAPER WHICH STATES THAT THIS "WOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE COVERAGE OF THE REDUCTIONS AREA". WHILE A COMPARATIVELY SMALL SYSTEM COULD PROVIDE A SIGNIFICANT INSPECTION CAPABILITY, ADDITIONAL TEAMS WOULD INCREASE THAT CAPABILITY, HOWEVER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM WOULD NOT NECESSARILY PROGRESS MATHEMATICALLY TO INCREASES IN STRENGTH.

(B) ANOTHER IMPORTANT FACTOR BEARING ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VERIFICATION IS THAT OF ACCESSABILITY. THE FEWER RESTRICTIONS THAT ARE PLACED ON INSPECTORATES THE MORE EFFECTIVE WILL BE THEIR WORK.

(B) THE NEGOTIATION OF EVEN A MINIMAL SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION WOULD BE SECRET

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AN IMPORTANT ADJUNCT TO OTHER, NATIONAL, MEANS OF CHECKING ON WP COMPLIANCE WITH AN AGREEMENT.

21. AERIAL INSPECTION

THIS IS THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE STUDY NOW ISSUED(1).

22. OBSERVERS

A SYSTEM OF HOST COUNTRY OBSERVERS TO LIAISE WITH INSPECTORS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL AND SOME SYSTEM OF LIAISON BETWEEN THE FORCES TO BE INSPECTED AND THE INSPECTION ORGANISATION WOULD BE NECESSARY(2). FOR THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW THE MAXIMUM FREEDOM FOR THE INSPECTORS WOULD REAP GREATER ADVANTAGES FOR THE WEST THAN IT WOULD FOR THE EAST. HOWEVER, THERE ARE CLEAR POLITICAL OBJECTIONS TO FREE ROVING EASTERN INSPECTORS BY COUNTRIES ON WHOSE SOIL THE INSPECTORS WOULD OPERATE.

23. RECIPROCITY

AS RECIPROCITY WOULD BE DEMANDED FROM THE OTHER SIDE TO VERIFY OUR PART OF THE NGA ONE COULD SAY THAT THE WP THEREFORE WERE ENTITLED TO HAVE 100 TEAMS. IF IT WERE THOUGHT POLITICALLY DESIRABLE TO KEEP THE NUMBER OF PACT TEAMS AS LOW AS POSSIBLE, BUT STILL MAINTAIN THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY, ONE MIGHT NEGOTIATE PERHAPS ON THE BASIS OF ONE TEAM PER 5,000 KM2.

AS WP TERRITORY TO BE INSPECTED COVERS 548,700 KM2 COMPARED WITH 314,900 KM2 OF NATO TERRITORY, THIS WOULD MEET OUR REQUIREMENT AND GIVE THE PACT THE RIGHT TO OPERATE 60 TEAMS. ALTERNATIVELY, THE WP MIGHT DO THEIR OWN CALCULATIONS ON THE LINES OF APPENDIX 1 AND DEMAND MORE TEAMS

CONCLUSION

24. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT:

(A) (1) TO VERIFY FORCE REDUCTIONS AND POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE SYSTEM.

(2) THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM WOULD BE ENHANCED IF THERE WERE ALSO A NUMBER OF STATIC-POSTS, PARTICULARLY
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IN THE WITHDRAWAL PHASE, AND SOME AERIAL INSPECTION.

(3) HOST COUNTRY OBSERVERS WITH INSPECTION TEAMS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL AND THE FORCES TO BE INSPECTED WOULD NEED LIAISON OFFICERS WITH THE INSPECTION ORGANISATION.

(4) FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW THE MAXIMUM FREEDOM FOR INSPECTORS WOULD REAP GREATER ADVANTAGES FOR THE WEST THAN FOR THE EAST.

(5) THE FEWER RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON INSPECTORATES THE MORE EFFECTIVE WILL BE THEIR WORK.

(B) THE PRECISE NUMBER OF TEAMS REQUIRED WOULD VARY WITH THE

ASSUMPTIONS ON WHAT IS TO BE INSPECTED, HOW FREQUENTLY AND IN WHAT DETAIL. THIS PRECISE NUMBER IS THEREFORE IMPOSSIBLE TO DEFINE AT THIS STAGE.

(C) TO ACHIEVE A MINIMAL SYSTEM OF INSPECTION WITH A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY OF DETECTING GROSS VIOLATIONS OF AN AGREEMENT AT LEAST 25 MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE REQUIRED. ADDITIONAL TEAMS WOULD INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ORGANISATION AND FOR FULLY COMPREHENSIVE VERIFICATION A MAXIMUM OF SOME 100 TEAMS WOULD BE REQUIRED.

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-19 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

SAM-01 DRC-01 /152 W

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SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 6 USNATO 2609

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A

CALCULATION OF NUMBER OF MOBILE TEAMS REQUIRED

IN THE POST-REDUCTION PHASE

ANALYSIS OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN EASTERN SECTORS OF NGA

1. DISTRIBUTION OF INSTALLATIONS BY COUNTRY AND TYPE AND
FREQUENCY OF INSPECTION.

GDR POLAND CSSR

(A) BARRACKS CONTAINING ONE

BATTALION OR MORE -

WEEKLY INSPECTION 380 340 300

(B) BARRACKS CONTAINING LESS

THAN ONE BATTALION -

SECRET

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INSPECTION ONLY "EN

PASSANT" 290 120 140

(C) STORES DEOTS WITH FEW OR

NO TROOPS - MONTHLY

INSPECTION 440 250 240

(D) PERMANENT AIRFIELDS -

WEEKLY INSPECTION 50 64 32

(E) TRAINING AREAS - WEEKLY

INSPECTION 60 28 13

2. THIS GIVES TOTALS OF 1,267 INSPECTIONS WEEKLY AND 930 INSPECTIONS MONTHLY; A GRAND TOTAL OF 5,998 INSPECTIONS EACH MONTH. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE HARD SURFACE ROAD NET WOULD BE COVERED MONTHLY BY TEAMS CARRYING OUT THESE INSPECTIONS. SIMILARLY, TEAMS WOULD NEED TO CHECK WHETHER ANY NEW AREAS OR ESTABLISHMENTS WERE BEING OPENED UP.

3. THE CRITERION OF "BARRACKS CONTAINING ONE BATTALION OR MORE" IS CHOSEN AS MORE ACCURATE THAN "ONE REGIMENT OR MORE" BECAUSE IN THE LATTER CASE, A GROUP OF BARRACKS CONTAINING A REGIMENT COULD BE MISSED OUT.

CALCULATIONS

4. WHILST IT IS NOTED FROM AC/276-WP(70)35(REVISED) THAT A MOBILE TEAM COULD CARRY OUT 25 VISITS EACH WEEK, THIS IS THOUGHT TO BE A HIGH FIGURE AND 20 VISITS IS USED FOR THIS PAPER. THIS IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF VISITS WHICH A TEAM COULD UNDERTAKE DUE TO THE THOROUGHNESS OF INSPECTION AND INTENSITY OF WORK REQUIRED. THE MATHEMATICAL REQUIREMENT FOR TEAMS IS THEREFORE:

TOTAL OF INSPECTIONS EACH MONTH EQUALS NUMBER OF TEAMS EQUALS 75
20 VISITS TIMES 4 WEEKS

5. ON THE SAME MATHEMATICAL BASIS THE DISTRIBUTION OF MOBILE TEAMS TO COUNTRIES WOULD BE:

(A) GDR TEAMS - 30
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(B) POLAD TEAMS - 25

(C) CSSR TEAMS - 20

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

6. THE GEOGRAPHY OF POLAD, CSSR AND THE GDR SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. POLAD (312,500 KM2) IS ABOUT THREE TIMES AS LARGE AS THE GDR (108,200 KM2) AND THE CSSR MEASURES 128,000 KM2.)

DISTANCES TO TRAVEL IN POLAD TO VISIT THE SAME NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS AS IN THE GDR ARE THREE TIMES LONGER; CONDITIONS OF ROADS ARE PERHAPS TWICE AS BAD AS THOSE IN THE GDR. IT IS DIFFICULT TO

ASSESS EXACTLY WITHOUT ANY DETAILED STUDY HOW MANY MORE TEAMS ARE REQUIRED IN POLAD BECUASE OF DISTANCES AND ROAD CONDITIONS ALONE. A "RULE OF THUMB" APPROACH WOULD BE TO CALCULATE THAT SINCE POLAD IS THREE TIMES AS BIG AS THE GDR AND THAT APPROXIMATELY 1/3 OF THE WORKING TIME OF INSPECTION TEAMS WOULD BE SPENT IN TRAVELLING WITH THE REMAINDER ON INSPECTION, THE NUMBER OF TEAMS IN POLAD MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 5 SHOULD BE DOUBLED. FOR THE CSSR, FIVE MORE TEAMS, TO COMPENSATE FOR GEOGRAPH WOULD DO.

7. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 ONE THEN ARRIVES AT THE FOLLOWING DISTRIBUTION OF MOBILE TEAMS OVER THE COUNTRIES:

	PARAGRAPH 5	ADD FOR	TOTAL
		PARAGRAPH 6	
GDR	TEAMS 30	-	TEAMS 30
POLAD	TEAMS 25	25	TEAMS 50
CSSR	TEAMS 20	5	TEAMS 25
	75	30	105

FOR WORKING PURPOSES THIS FIGURE CAN BE ROUNDED TO 100.

AIRFIELDS AND PORTS
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8. THE CALCULATION OF MOBILE TEAMS COVERS WEEKLY VISITS TO AIRFIELDS. PORTS HAVE NOT BEEN INCLUDED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

(A) MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN PORT AREAS WILL ALREADY BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION.

(B) THE SIZE OF THE INSPECTION ORGANIZATION WOULD NEED TO BE GREATLY INCREASED.

(C) FORCES LANDED AT PORTS WOULD NEED TO MOVE TO MOVE SUITABLE DEPLOYMENT AREAS. ANY LARGE SCALE MOVEMENT SHOULD BE NOTED BY MOBILE TEAMS.

(D) SEA MOVEMENT, FROM THE WP VIEW, WOULD BE CUMBERSOME.

(E) AMPHIBIOUS NAVAL SHIPS COULD LAND GROUND FORCES ACROSS ANY SUITABLE BEACH.

FOOTNOTES:

(1) AC/118-R(74)4

(2) AC/276-WP(70)35(REVISED)

AC/276-D(72)1

(3) US PAPER "NEGOTIATED INSPECTION" 5TH OCTOBER, 1973

(4) AC276-WP(74)4 (REVISED)

(5) THE WORKING GROUP NOTED THE FRG VIEW THAT THE CURRENT DISCUSSIONS
IN THE SPC ON THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF OVERT INSPECTION MUST
HAVE A MAJOR EFFECT ON ANY FINAL DECISION AND THAT, AS A RESULT OF
THESE DISCUSSIONS, FURTHER STUDIES MAY BE NECESSARY.

(6) C-M(73)83(FINAL)

FOOTNOTES TO ANNEX

(1) AC276-WF(74)9(1ST REVISE)

(2) ISD/61(4TH REVISED)

END TEXT

RUMSFELD

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